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With the end of the First World War, when Europe had to recover from 
the bloodiest conflict in its history, most people longed for a sense of secu-
rity and believed that anything similar would never happen again.1 On 
account of its area and its still primary significance, Great Britain had to 
act as one of the guarantors of the new arrangement. Its relationship or, 
more precisely, its politicians’ relationship to the established League of 
Nations (LoN) was ambivalent,2 but not completely dismissive. At the end 
of 1919, with the USA refusing to join the new organisation, London’s 
position changed and complicated. A hypothetical possibility of a mutual 
conflict because of Washington’s non-membership in the LoN and the 
issue of dominions, with the idea of a joint imperial politics quickly van-
ishing after 1918, brought about reassessment of British priorities in for-
eign politics. In the future, Great Britain was to become involved only 
where its life interests required it.
This fact was closely related to the issue of collective security in Eu-
rope and attempts for its provision in the 1920s. In the early 1920s, several 
efforts were made to establish a collective security system under the auspi-
ces of the League of Nations (the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the 
Geneva Protocol3), but all of them were rejected by London from different 
reasons. It was only willing to participate in the project of guaranteeing the 
1 On the other hand smaler states continued to support armaments industry after 1918. 
&RPSDUH IRU H[DPSOH$ 6.ě,9$1On the Nature and Role of Arms Production in 
Interwar Czechoslovakia, in: The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 4, 
2010, pp. 630–RU$6.ě,9$1Weapons from the Heart of Europe. On Czechoslo-
vak Arms Exports in the Interwar Period, in: Rivista di Storia Economica, a. XXVII, n. 1, 
aprile 2011, pp. 73–91.
2 While the Labourists and Liberals welcomed the idea of a new organisation, the attitude 
of the Conservative Party and conservative press was different. Compare L. NOVOTNÝ,
9HONi%ULWiQLH.RQ]HUYDWLYQt VWUDQD D Y]QLN 6SROHþQRVWL QiURGĤ, in: Historický obzor, 
Vol. 21, No. 7/8, 2010, pp. 178–188.
3 Compare L. NOVOTNÝ, Konzervativní vláda Stanleyho Baldwina a její odmítnutí 
Ženevského protokolX3ĜtVSČYHNNSRNXVĤPRY\WYRĜHQtNROHNWLYQtEH]SHþQRVWLYHGYDFá-
tých letech 20. století, in: Ä'YDFiWpVWROHWt³5RþHQND6HPLQiĜHQHMQRYČMãtFKGČMLQÒVWDYX
VYČWRYêFKGČMLQ)LOR]RILFNpIDNXOW\8QLYHU]LW\.DUORY\Y3UD]HSS–153.
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western borders of France and Belgium, which stood outside of the League 
of Nations.
On 20th January 1925, Germany came with a draft pact upon which 
powers interested in the Rhine, particularly Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Germany, would undertake not to wage war against signatory coun-
tries. The purpose of this study is to analyze British approach to the Ger-
man proposal and its transformations within the short period of July and 
August 1925 when, after feverish negotiations on a potential pact between 
London and Paris,4 governments in both cities were impatiently waiting 
for Berlin’s reaction to the French response regarding the German memo-
randum of early 1925.
*
On 20th July 1925, Germany officially replied to the French note of mid 
June. Ambassadors Friedrich Sthamer and Leopold von Hoesch delivered 
their government’s responses in London and Paris at the same hour. Berlin 
acknowledged the French thesis that a security pact in no case means a 
modification of current treaties, not excluding, however, a possibility of 
later amendments should the situation in Europe change.5
The second point of the German note concerned arbitration treaties. 
Berlin rejected the French notion of unlimited arbitration, repeating its 
suggestion that only some disputes be resolved by the arbitration court. It 
also opposed the idea of the allies having under certain circumstances 
(such as failure to fulfil reparation obligations or violation of the demilita-
rized Rhineland zone) the right to intervene immediately without waiting 
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.6
The German government also expressed its view on the issue of 
Germany joining the League of Nations. It did not consider it an insur-
mountable problem but pointed out one fact: Germany had been disarmed 
and its present entry in the LoN would mean that it wouldn’t have the 
same rights as other member. In Berlin’s opinion, general disarmament 
should therefore follow as soon as possible.7
After the German note’s submission, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs Austen Chamberlain telegraphed to British Ambassador in Berlin 
4 In detail compare L. NOVOTNÝ, Velká Británie a cesta k 5êQVNpPXJDUDQþQtPXSDk-
tu, in: Dvacáté století – The Twentieth Century, 2011, No. 1, pp. 71–87.
5 P. URBANITSCH, Großbritannien und die Verträge von Locarno, Diss., Wien 1968, p. 
185.
6 Ibidem, p. 186.
7 A. ORDE, Great Britain and International Security 1920–1926, London 1978, p. 112. Compa-
re also The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), FO 371/10736, C 9581/459/18, 
Mr. Sthamer to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received July 20), July 20, 1925.
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D’Abernon8 to inform him about this fact. According to the Secretary of 
State, the German government chose such a style of replying that could be 
called a middle way, in order to avoid being blamed later for evasiveness 
or, on the other hand, for accepting “every detail of the French pro-
posals.”9
Having read his government’s response to Chamberlain, Sthamer 
expressed his hope “that the next step would not be too long delayed.”
The Secretary of State replied that he could not tell him anything definite, 
because a document of such significance needed to be studied in detail and 
discussed with French and Belgian governments. The head of the Foreign 
Office only expressed a vague hope that the German government initiative 
would certainly lead “to the establishment of peace on a securer founda-
tion, and to the creation of better relations between Germany and the 
Western Powers than any which had existed since the outbreak of war”.10
After submission of the German note, a dispute was reignited at the 
Foreign Office concerning the sequence of the guarantees’ implementation 
and decision of the Council of the League of Nations.11 In its response, 
Berlin refused the idea adopted by France that in certain cases there would 
be no waiting for the Council League’s verdict. Two groups stood against 
each other at the Foreign Office. J. C. Sterndale Bennett and Miles Lamp-
son rejected Paris’ opinion, reasoning that the proposed treaties must not 
be considered as oriented against Germany.12
Both men thus clearly supported the position of the younger gener-
ation at the Foreign Office, claiming that Germany would not be able to 
threaten peace in Europe in the short term.13 Bennett even dared to ask 
whether Great Britain wasn’t too prone to believe that it had always been 
Germany who acted in bad faith and that the French, on the other hand, 
had never acted in bad faith.14
8 Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount D’Abernon (1857–1941), ambassador to Berlin in the years 
1920–1926.
9 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9636/459/18, Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon 
(Berlin), July 20, 1925. The German Ambassador told Chamberlain that it was not only 
the government who hoped for the success of further negotiations, but also the top repre-
sentatives of the state, as well as majority of the public.
10 Ibidem. At the end of their conversation, Sthamer asked Chamberlain not to publish the 
German note sooner than in two days, explaining this by internal political reasons (these 
concerned a debate in the Reichstag).
11 Disputes at the Foreign Office already began at the end of the first decade in July and 
concerned the future role of the League of Nations in the prepared pact. Compare TNA, 
FO 371/10736, C 9216/459/18, Minute by Lampson, July 11, 1925.
12 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9784/459/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, July 22, 1925.
13 E. MAISEL, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1926, Sussex 1994, p. 179.
14 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9784/459/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, July 22, 1925.
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Chamberlain and William Tyrrell were convinced of the opposite
and therefore decided to support the French position. The Permanent Un-
der-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs defended his position on the 
grounds that Paris’ concerns about a new war conflict had to be mitigated, 
while the Foreign Secretary simply refused that a situation might arise 
when London would not help France only because of the indecisiveness of 
the Council of the League of Nations.
Of course, Chamberlain’s and Tyrrell’s opinions eventually pre-
vailed in this dispute, and the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that 
Legal Advisers Sir Cecil Hurst and Henri Fromageot should prepare such 
a proposal on this issue that would clearly indicate that in case of a viola-
tion of the demilitarized Rhineland or an outburst of violence, the guaran-
tee treaties would come into effect even if the Council of the League of 
Nations does not reach a decision.15
Austen Chamberlain criticized one more thing about the German 
note; he didn’t like that Berlin touched upon the issue of occupied territo-
ries. According to him, it even contradicted that what was promised by the 
German Foreign Minister in February 1925. At that time, Gustav Strese-
mann declared that the proposed security pact would not stipulate any 
change of conditions in the occupied territories.
A few days later, the Secretary of State talked in a more lenient 
tone. At a meeting in Birmingham, he expressed his regrets over the fact 
that another exchange of notes would now be necessary but appreciated the 
German initiative and willingness to continue negotiations. Prime Minister
Stanley Baldwin talked in a similarly positive spirit. In one of his speech-
es, which otherwise rarely dealt with foreign policy, he welcomed German 
readiness to talks on the prospective pact.16
The British public opinion on the German note was reserved but 
not dismissive.17 General surprise prevailed that Germany, for the first 
time since the end of the war, chose a tone appropriate for a superpower. 
Satisfaction with the content was not so prevalent. Conservative press 
pointed out that France’s and Germany’s positions on many questions still 
differed.18
15 Ibidem.
16 Compare URBANITSCH, pp. 187–188.
17 The note was only published on 22nd July; London thus probably complied with the 
German request. Compare note 9.
18 Compare Daily Telegraph, 22nd July 1925. The liberal newspaper Manchester Guardian 
expressed a similar opinion, adding, however, that no significant progress could have 
been expected. Compare Manchester Guardian, 22nd July 1925. Daily Express was the 
only newspaper to perceive the German note, as evidence of Berlin does not want further 
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On 22nd July 1925, the Reichstag assembled for a foreign policy 
debate. However, the Foreign Minister Stresemann talked just briefly. He 
only mentioned the French Foreign Minister’s note and the German reply. 
On the security issue, he just said that the advantage of the new pact for 
Germany is the provision of security at its western border.19 “His speech 
which was conciliatory in tone was well received. The house was some-
what listless owing to the extreme heat,” the British Ambassador to Berlin 
complained at the end of his telegram.20
News from the French capital was also optimistic. The Secretary of 
the British Embassy in Paris Phipps informed Austen Chamberlain that 
French press mostly considered the German note a sign that left open door 
to further negotiations. On the other hand, Phipps said, there was a suspi-
cion in certain circles that Berlin was attempting to change provisions of 
the Treaty of Versailles, thus ridding France of the advantage of its current 
alliance system.21
In the meantime, the debate on the future orientation of German 
foreign policy continued without any distraction in Berlin. The social 
democratic deputy Rudolf Breitscheid said that the government chose a 
correct foreign policy concept and Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) therefore had no reason 
to join the no-confidence motion. Count Westarp22 also had no objections 
to the governmental policy. Opposition was only voiced from both ex-
treme camps of the political spectrum; right wing radicals and com-
munists. They claimed that if Germany signed the guarantee pact, it would 
join the western superpowers’ alliance oriented against the Soviet Union.23
negotiations. In its opinion, the British Empire was thus freed from the danger that the 
security pact posed for its unity. Compare Daily Express, 22nd July 1925.
19 “Das Ziel dieser Erörterungen ist der Pakt mit Deutschland, nicht aber Dreimächte-
pakt gegen Deutschland, sondern der von ihnen mit Deutschland zu schließende Pakt,”
he added. G. STRESEMANN, Vermächtnis: der Nachlass in drei Bänden, Bd. 2, Berlin 
1932, p. 156.
20 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9738/459/18, Telegram from Lord D’Abernon (Berlin), July 
22, 1925.
21 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9729/459/18, Telegram from Mr. Phipps (Paris), July 22, 
1925. Chamberlain only received the report on the next morning. Radical right-wing 
circles adopted a hostile position on the German note, claiming that it was an attempt to 
destroy the current order in Europe. At the end of his report, Phipps noted that most of 
the public in France was willing to negotiate with Germany but was also aware that it 
would not be easy.
22 Kuno von Westarp (1864–1945), co-founder of the DNVP (Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei), its chairman in the years 1926–1928.
23 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 9817/459/18, Telegram from Lord D’Abernon (Berlin), July 
23, 1925.
Lukáš Novotný 
Great Britain and the Journey to the Rhineland Pact (July–August 1925). A Contribution 
to the Issue of Collective Security in the 1920s
64
According to D’Abernon, it was clear that most of the Reichstag would 
support approving the German reply to Aristide Briand’s note. The British 
Ambassador noted “that terms of pact should not curtail any advantages 
accruing from membership of League nor absolve the other Powers from 
obligation to disarm”. However, in his opinion, Berlin expected some 
concessions, particularly concerning occupation costs, should the pact 
come into effect.24
On 20th July 1925, the legal adviser of the French government, 
Fromageot, arrived in the British capital, bringing with him France’s ob-
jections to the proposed pact. These mainly concerned the possibility of a 
state taking action without a clearly defined procedure. Paris feared two 
things in particular: 1) postponement of a decision by the Council of the 
League of Nations regarding the question of aggressor, and 2) the option
that the Council will not reach any decision. France believed that this situ-
ation threatened to arise, because the Council’s verdict had to be unani-
mous and some, particularly smaller, states could come to the conclusion 
that it was not German aggression.25
Some members of the Central Department at the Foreign Office
thought that French requirements should be refused. However, Austen 
Chamberlain believed that it was suitable to accept this requirement and 
present it to the Parliament as something giving London freedom of ac-
tion. The ministry agreed that at a meeting with Fromageot, the Foreign 
Office legal adviser Cecil Hurst should try to gain his consent with the 
part of the draft talking about the guarantor’s course of action. London 
imagined that it would only be forced to act prior to a decision by the 
Council of the League of Nations if a conflict really erupted or if military 
forces of one of the parties undoubtedly breached the demilitarized zone.26
On 23rd July 1925, Austen Chamberlain informed Phipps, the Secretary of 
the British Embassy in Paris, about the meeting with the legal adviser of 
the French government Fromageot. Ambassador Aimé Joseph de Fleuriau 
was also present at the meeting, and Chamberlain invited Cecil Hurst as 
well, who briefed the Secretary of State on the course his previous meet-
ings with Fromageot. The head of the Foreign Office was willing to accept 
24 Ibidem. In the end, the government clearly won the vote of confidence. 235 deputies 
were in favour, 158 were against, and 13 legislators abstained from voting.
25 ORDE, p. 115.
26 Compare TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9693/459/18, Foreign Office Memorandum (Mr. 
Bennett), July 21, 1925; NA, FO 371/10736, C 9784/459/18, Foreign Office Memoran-
dum, July 22, 1925.
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some of France’s objections, but refused adding the words “hostile action” 
to article two of the proposed pact.27
In the second part of his letter to Eric Phipps, Austen Chamberlain 
expressed his conviction that the negotiations reached a point when His 
Majesty’s Government would be favourable to guarantee France’s security 
in case of a sudden German attack. However, he did not forget to mention 
two dangers that had to be avoided, in his opinion. “In the first place, the 
power of His Majesty’s Government to persuade British public opinion to 
accept the obligations of the guarantee was dependent upon the guarantee 
itself being clearly limited to the real dangers against which it was intend-
ed to provide…” The Secretary of State was afraid that France’s require-
ments in many cases exceed the British public limits. Secondly, Chamber-
lain repeated the government’s intention not to participate directly in any 
allied arrangement on German eastern border. “… I trusted that the west-
ern pact would not be allowed to founder on these eastern rocks, for I 
must say plainly that it is thus came to grief there would be an end of any 
possibility of a British Government taking part in any pact at all”, the 
Secretary of State wrote at the end of his letter.28
Great Britain and France agreed that if the German note required a 
detailed written reply, talks with Berlin should begin as soon as possible. 
London suggested that the British text of early July 1925, which did not 
impose any obligations on anybody, became a basis for negotiations and 
also came with the idea of inviting the legal adviser of the German gov-
ernment, Friedrich Gaus. He was supposed to meet with Hurst and Fro-
mageot and try to reach agreement; subsequently, foreign ministers were 
supposed to meet and make the final decision. Germany expressed funda-
mental disagreement with this course of action. Berlin required that the 
ministers meet before the final wording of the proposal. This was due to 
concerns that Gaus could be forced to political decisions; the fact that he 
had not seen the document before was also to Gaus’ disadvantage.29
One day later (24th July), the Secretary of State wrote to his French
colleague. According to Chamberlain, there was no fundamental disa-
greement between Great Britain and France. “France desires the reduc-
tion of armaments as we desire it. We recognise, as France recognises, 
that the obstacle to disarmament is the sense of insecurity which prevails 
in Europe, and that the road to disarmament lies through security. This is 
27 TNA, FO 371/10736, C 9802/459/18, Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris), 
July 23, 1925. Chamberlain was ready to recommend to the government the acceptance 
of most proposals incorporated by Fromageot and Hurst in section 8 of the agreement 
draft.
28 Ibidem.
29 Compare ORDE, p. 116.
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the basis of the policy of the Mutual Pact which we are pursuing together 
at this moment,” the head of the Foreign Office wrote.30
Furthermore, Chamberlain suggested to Briand the possibility of 
agreeing on a joint course of action for the immediate future. In his opinion,
neither London nor Paris should presently take any steps toward a new 
proposal regarding the security issue. Should anybody else take such steps, 
we should jointly depreciate the subsequent discussion until the result of 
the current information exchange on the pact is known and until all associ-
ated maters are closed, the Secretary of State demanded.31
However, Eric Phipps’ report from Paris at the end of July was not 
very encouraging. He talked about the German note with Philipp Berthelot 
from the French foreign ministry,32 who told him that he was not very 
pleased with the document. Moreover, he disclosed his intention to pro-
pose a reply to the German government clearly indicating that Germany 
must definitely agree with regular arbitration treaties that would be differ-
ent from the peculiar agreements Berlin made with Switzerland and Swe-
den. The mandatory arbitration institute was another important point, ac-
cording to Berthelot; conditio sine qua non of any agreement was uncon-
ditional entry of Germany in the League of Nations, according to him.33
The Secretary of the French foreign ministry also mentioned the is-
sue of a conference that was supposed to be attended by representatives of 
Germany. He said that at that moment the idea of meeting with the Ger-
man party was premature; Aristide Briand was of the same opinion. “It 
would be folly to consent to a conference untill all the principle points had 
been settled beforehand between the British and French governments,”
said Berthelot.34
On 28th July 1925, the French Foreign Minister received the Secre-
tary of the British Embassy in Paris. According to Phipps, Briand agreed 
with the idea of an informal discussion with Austen Chamberlain and par-
ticularly insisted on demonstrating “a united front to the Germans by 
30 TNA, CAB 24/174, C.P. 373 (25), July 24, 1925.
31 Ibidem. At the end of his letter, Chamberlain noted that these steps must be taken under 
complete cooperation with Belgium. 
32 Philippe-Joseph-Louis Berthelot (1866–1934) was the Secretary at the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Until his death, he was one of the influential personalities at French 
domestic political scene.
33 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 9984/459/18, Telegram from Mr. Phipps (Paris), July 27, 
1925.




reaching an absolute agreement between Great Britain and France before 
meeting them” [Germans – L. N.].35
The Secretary of State returned to the assessment of the German 
note of 20th July 1925 one more time, in his letter to Ambassador 
D’Abernon. Chamberlain informed Berlin that he met with the German 
Ambassador who told him that his impression was that the Secretary of 
State was not satisfied with the wording of the note. “I am bound to admit 
that he had correctly diagnosed my feeling, and that subsequent examina-
tion of the note has only confirmed my first impression,” Chamberlain 
wrote.36
The head of the Foreign Office decided to provide D’Abernon with 
a detailed analysis of the aspects of the note he disagreed with.37 The min-
ister believed that a meeting of the negotiating parties at the earliest possi-
ble date was not appropriate. Furthermore, he advised the German gov-
ernment to accept the French note of June 1925 as a basis for subsequent 
negotiations, preferably with no other comments. “The German Govern-
ment have not seen fit to accept this advice,” Chamberlain said, adding: 
“They had it in their power to write a note which would have enabled me 
to insist on immediate conversations. They have chosen instead to write a 
note which will probably render unavoidable a further reply before any 
effective progress can be made.”38
Germany’s entry in the League of Nations was another problem. 
According to Chamberlain, Berlin had known from the beginning that for 
the Allies, this step was neither a prerequisite for commencing negotia-
tions on the security pact, nor a requirement for its signing, but an essen-
tial issue for the pact to come into effect. “The Allies cannot enter into a 
discussion of the difficulties which Germany may find in entering the 
League. Any discussion of that nature must be conducted between Germa-
ny and the League itself, on whose behalf the Allies have no right to 
speak,” the Secretary of State wrote.39
Chamberlain was most disappointed by the passage of the German 
note talking about a new arrangement of the occupied territory in the 
35 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 9994/459/18, Telegram from Mr. Phipps (Paris), July 28, 
1925. Phipps had a good impression from the meeting with Briand. The French Foreign 
Minister also suggested coming to London and talking with his British colleague.
36 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 10034/459/18, Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon 
(Berlin), July 28, 1925.
37 Chamberlain decided for this form of communication, because he wanted D’Abernon 
to discuss everything directly with Stresemann.
38 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 10034/459/18, Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon 
(Berlin), July 28, 1925.
39 Ibidem.
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Rhineland. The Secretary of State was offended because D’Abernon had 
previously assured him on behalf of the German government that Berlin 
would not require amendment of articles 428–432 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles as a prerequisite for signing the pact. In this context, Chamberlain 
asked the Ambassador about advisability of such a position of the German 
government.40
In conclusion of his letter, the Secretary of State contemplated the 
phenomenon of security, which he described as “a state of mind rather 
than a physical fact.” If there is trust, stability will follow, he thought. The 
German negotiation proposition of February 1925 was important, accord-
ing to Chamberlain, because it brought hope of stability and trust and, 
eventually, security. The German note of 20th July tried to pursue another 
principle, on the other hand. According to the head of the Foreign Office,
the German government “no longer appear in the rôle of a far-seeing con-
tributor to the general cause of peace, but rather in that of a somewhat 
unwilling participant, who acquiesces in a scheme, not because of its in-
trinsic merits, but merely in the hope that concent will enable him to drive 
a bargain in other directions. In a word, the German note raises again 
those doubts as to Germany’s real intentions, which had in a large meas-
ure been allayed, and which must be cleared up if a lasting settlement is to 
be reached.”41
In Berlin, the situation was perceived differently. The German 
government asked Ambassador D’Abernon to submit the message to Lon-
don that it would be very dangerous for the pact negotiations at that mo-
ment if France came with a new note without any previous consultation. 
According to Berlin’s position, some disagreements persisted which, how-
ever, were not of such nature so as to cause failure of the agreement. 
However, further talks had to take place through confidential diplomatic 
channels, D’Abernon informed on the German position, adding: “Appre-
hension is acute lest a new French note should be sent, and is still more 
acute lest it should be published. Such a course would gravely increase 
party difficulties here.”42
Austen Chamberlain was unpleasantly surprised by this German 
requirement. He wrote a sharp letter to Berlin, saying: “I am amazed at 
the blindness of the German government to the inevitable consequences of 
their own action. They had it in their power to close the exchange of 
notes.” In his opinion, Berlin only considered its internal political interests 
40 Ibidem. Chamberlain was afraid that this German requirement could cause the entire 
negotiations to fail.
41 Ibidem.




when drawing up the document, which was why the resulting treatise re-
sembled more of an election manifesto that was sent to the French gov-
ernment.43
According to Chamberlain, the German government realized the 
consequences of its actions after the note was disclosed and therefore 
turned to D’Abernon to ask him to deliver a message to his minister. In 
Berlin’s opinion, Allies’ governments should now show “a patience, for-
bearance and statesmanship, not to say a courage, in face of public opin-
ion of which in effect they avow themselves incapable.” Chamberlain 
wrote to D’Abernon that he probably did not realize what problems Berlin 
groundlessly caused not only to itself, but also to others. The last para-
graph of Chamberlain’s letter was marked as confidential, indicating the 
possibility of the Secretary of State together with Briand attempting to 
save Germany from the natural consequences of its course of action, “but 
I dare not count on it,” he wrote.44
At the end of July 1925, the situation around the security pact ne-
gotiations became more complicated. In Austen Chamberlain’s opinion, 
Germany was to blame, posing a question of its future credibility by rais-
ing further requirements in its note of 20th July. The Secretary of State 
believed that Berlin should have simply accepted the French note of June 
1925 as a basis for subsequent negotiations. Paris was not completely sat-
isfied either. Through one of its important officials, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs requested that Germany enter in regular arbitration agree-
ments with its eastern neighbours, agree with the institute of mandatory 
arbitration in case of a conflict and join the League of Nations as soon as 
possible. Berlin, on the other hand, would consider rather inappropriate if 
France came with a new note, which would be published.
The French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, was ready to meet 
with his German colleague Stresemann, but only under the condition that 
he first reaches full agreement with Great Britain. He therefore suggested 
to the Secretary of the British Embassy in Paris, Phipps that he would 
come to London to talk directly with Austen Chamberlain.45
Paris proposed changes of the British text following, in its opinion, 
from the talks between Hurst and Fromageot. According to the French 
Ambassador in London, two points were particularly important: in article 
2, Paris wanted to add the phrase “ou à des actes hostiles” after the words 
43 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 9992/459/18, Chamberlain to Lord D’Abernon (Berlin), July 
30, 1925.
44 Ibidem.
45 Compare note 34. The Secretary of State informed the government about his French 
colleague’s intention to come to London. Compare TNA, CAB 23/50, War Cabinet and 
Cabinet, Conclusions, Cabinet 43 (25), August 5, 1925.
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“après les cas d’intervention ou d’attaque”, as a reaction to articles 42 
and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.46
The French Foreign Minister believed that this amendment is very 
important for the overall reading of the agreement. Another thing that 
France wanted to add concerned the actual voting in the Council of the 
League of Nations and partially also a potential danger of this procedure 
being misused. Briand therefore proposed the formulation: “Le présent 
traité [meaning the British proposal – L. N.] devra être soumis au Conseil 
de la Société des Nations et devra être reconnu par le Conseil comme un 
engagement conforme au Pacte de la Société.”47
At the end of the first decade in August, Ambassador D’Abernon 
let himself be heard again after a short pause. In his report to London, he 
informed about Berlin’s probable positions on the main points of the dis-
cussed pact. “The following has been obtained from a secret source but 
may be regarded as exceptionally reliable,” he wrote.48
In his opinion, the German government would unreservedly accept 
the principle that a military intervention would only be possible after an 
impartial procedure, not upon a unilateral decision. Furthermore, it would 
not require amendment of the Treaty of Versailles, but the arbitration insti-
tute must include cases of its different interpretation, D’Abernon wrote.49
However, the Ambassador thought that Berlin would deem inacceptable
not only the French guarantee of German-Polish arbitration agreement, but 
particularly the fact that France would unilaterally decide on its coming 
into effect. Germany, on the other hand, softened its objections to its join-
ing the League of Nations. “It is generally conceded that agreement on 
this question is attainable consequent on agreement on other points,” the 
Ambassador referred.50
In the question of France’s guaranteeing the German-Polish arbi-
tration agreement, Germany could rely on Great Britain’s position. Lon-
don claimed from the very beginning that it was not interested in the issue 
46 TNA, FO 371/10737, C 10146/459/18, Note communicated by Mr. de Fleuriau, July 
31, 1925.
47 Ibidem.
48 TNA, FO 371/10738, C 10554/459/18, Telegram from Lord D’Abernon (Berlin), 
August 10, 1925. At the end of July, an article appeared in the New Statesman that prai-
sed Gustav Stresemann and German foreign policy: “Either Dr. Stresemann is a much 
abler man than any of his predecessors within recent years, or he is much more ably 
advised. Even the most keen-eyed and hair-splitting of the Germanophobes of the 
Parisian Press have found it impossible to discover any serious fault in the German reply 
to the French note on the proposed Security Pact.” New Statesman, 25th July 1925.





of guarantees of arbitration agreements between Germany and its eastern 
neighbours and that it did not consider this question fundamental or bind-
ing for the pact itself.
Austen Chamberlain considered important that the negotiations do 
not fail due to the issue of guaranteeing arbitration agreements with Ger-
many’s eastern neighbours. “Chamberlains feste Haltung betreffs der 
Sanktionen und seine unverhüllte Drohung bezüglich des Ostproblems 
beweisen einmal mehr, daß das Foreign Office nicht gesonnen war, die 
französische Politik zu unterstützen, wenn sie mit den britischen Konzepti-
onen nicht zu vereinbaren war,“ Peter Urbanitsch wrote.51
*
Great Britain or, more precisely, the Foreign Office’s response to the 
German memorandum of early 1925 could be seen as cold, which was 
mainly caused by the uncertainty about Berlin’s actual intentions and a 
threat to the existing concept of the Foreign Office, consisting in an 
agreement with France. However, after London’s rejection of the Geneva 
Protocol idea in March 1925, a situation arose when the British cabinet 
decided that the best means of achieving European security, while main-
taining the established foreign policy limits, was represented by the Ger-
man proposal of January 1925. This also initiated more than half-year long 
marathon of negotiations, which ended by the Locarno Conference. Great 
Britain’s position was not easy. Austen Chamberlain realized that without 
British participation this project was bound to fail, which is why he pro-
moted a more active approach than before. This meant appealing to France 
and Germany to align their ideas or, at least, to try to alleviate their mis-
trust and unwillingness to cooperate and leave any contentious issues for 
the joint meeting of the involved parties. However, London’s position on 
one fundamental thing did not change even at this point – the British Gov-
ernment refused any engagement in the area east of the Rhine.
On 20th July, Germany published its response to the French note of 
mid June 1925. Neither London, nor Paris accepted its content quite posi-
tively, but Austen Chamberlain appreciated the fact that Berlin expressed 
its willingness to continue negotiating even though this meant another 
exchange of notes, in his opinion. At the same time, Great Britain and 
France agreed on commencing serious talks with Germany as soon as pos-
sible. After the situation became more complicated at the turn of July and 
August 1925, because Berlin, in Austen Chamberlain’s opinion, raised 
further requirements, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand suggested
51 URBANITSCH, pp. 217–218. Sir William Tyrrell expressed a similar opinion. Accor-
ding to him, London could not allow any European country to become a hegemon in 
Europe.
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he would come to London and speak directly with his British colleague. 
Afterward, he was also willing to meet with Gustav Stresemann. The situ-
ation thus reached the point when a meeting of the French and British for-
eign ministers was necessary, with both men talking about the text of the 
French response to the German note of 20th July 1925. Negotiations on the 
Locarno Pact thus entered another, decisive stage.52
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